

The UN and International Peace and Security: Navigating Peace in a Divided World? British Perspectives

COLLATED WITNESS BRIEFS

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Lesley Abdela

Position(s) held (including dates):	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Independent consultant on gender, equal opportunities, women's political empowerment and women's human rights and freelance journalist; - Senior Gender Adviser to UN agencies in Nepal, 2007-8; - Board member of the British Council, 1995-2000; - Board member of the International Institute for Environment and Development, 1992-97; - Deputy Director for Democracy, OSCE Mission in Pristina, 1993; - Co-founder and Leader of all-Party 300 GROUP campaign to increase women's representation in government, 1980-85.
Which session is your brief most relevant to?	Relevant to more than one session
Brief Title:	n/a
Year, Country, UN Agency where appropriate:	Kosovo
What were the main lessons learned?	<p><u>Relevant published work:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - On Kosovo: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Men with a mission: no women (March 2000) o Vote for chaos (June 2000) o Missed Opportunities, Lessons for the Future (2000) o 1325: Deeds not words (October 2005) - On gender representation: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Bring women to the table (October 2008) o Finally, a UN agency for women (May 2009) o Women's Hour discussion on UN Women (December 2010)
Please provide references to books/memoirs/reports/articles, etc., if relevant:	See above

Dame Margaret Anstee

Position(s) held (including dates):	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Director-General of the UN in Vienna, Head of the Centre for Social Development and Humanitarian Affairs and Coordinator of all UN narcotic drug-control programmes, 1987-92; - Secretary-General's Special Representative to Angola, 1992-3.
Which session is your brief most relevant to?	Relevant to more than one session
Brief Title:	n/a
Year, Country, UN Agency where appropriate:	n/a
What were the main lessons learned?	<p><u>General</u></p> <p>Most of my 41 years as a UN civil servant (1952-1993) were spent in the field on operational programmes and, when at Headquarters – New York (1974-1987) and Vienna (1987-1992) - I was directing operational programmes all over the world. Initially, therefore, I had little knowledge the UK's performance or policies in the Security Council. My contribution</p>

	<p>is predominantly from the field perspective of a British national working in different parts of the Secretariat, without the political support of the UK Government, except on rare occasions.</p> <p>Beginning as a local staff member in a tiny new office in the Philippines I was very remote from Headquarters and the political and policy making bodies in New York. This changed in 1956 when I went to Latin America as the first woman field officer of EPTA/TAB and then the UN Special Fund (later joined to form UNDP). As a Resident Representative I found myself for the first time in an intensely political environment. Resistance to American dominance of Latin America in pursuit of the anachronistic Monroe doctrine (1823) was growing, fuelled by several egregious acts of aggression by the United States. The Cold War was escalating and any signs of non-conformity or liberal policies were construed as Communist sympathies.</p> <p>In 1964 the US intervened to unseat the democratically elected President of the Dominican Republic, Juan Bosch, in a manner reminiscent of the way in which they had engineered the overthrow of Colonel Jacobo Arbenz of Guatemala a decade earlier, in 1954. On one of my rare visits to New York en route to home leave and , invited to lunch by Sir Hugh Foot (later Lord Caradon), then UK Permanent Representative. I expressed my dismay and surprise that, given his liberal views; he had supported the US actions over Bosch. I recall he sounded rather embarrassed as he explained that it had been thought best to do so because of the special relationship with the US and the need for Western solidarity. One cannot help suspecting that similar considerations will have guided UK positions at the UN.</p> <p><u>UK support of British Nationals</u></p> <p>Early on I discovered that, while many member states were assiduous in promoting the careers of their nationals already in the secretariat, the UK was averse to doing so. This "hands off" approach was of course the morally correct policy, though I said at the time "The UK is playing cricket while everyone else is playing American football!"</p> <p>I rose gradually in the ranks of EPTA/TAB and then UNDP field staff under my own steam. I only began to be noticed with my transfer to UNDP Headquarters in 1974, and then my promotion to UNDP Assistant Administrator (Assistant Secretary-General level) in 1977 and then Assistant UN Secretary-General on transfer to the main UN secretariat in 1978. I was the first woman to reach the ASG level. The UN post came about because the Secretary-General rejected two UK nationals proposed by HMG for the newly- created Department for Technical Cooperation as insufficiently qualified and decided to appoint me instead. Thus the UK assisted my appointment but without meaning to do so!</p> <p>Then I stagnated for 8 years and became the longest serving ASG at that time. There was still no woman Under-Secretary-General. Opportunities did arise and I was considered by many to be the most qualified candidate within the secretariat, but was constantly passed over on grounds of my British nationality and my gender. Such posts included High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) twice, and Director of the World Food Programme (WFP). Initially the UK Government supported me for both of these but this support crumpled in favour of male</p>
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	<p>candidates proposed by other states – a Swiss candidate proposed by the USA in the case of UNHCR (he left under a cloud before completing his term and I was proposed again but by then it was too late) and an Australian presented by his government at the last moment. In all the cases HMG did not seem prepared to mount a strong campaign or stay the course in the face of alternative candidates presented by political allies.</p> <p>In 1986 when Sir Brian Urquhart retired, the then Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar told me he wished to promote me to Under-Secretary General and appoint me to head all peacekeeping operations. This time the UK actively opposed my advancement, having a candidate of their own, a senior British diplomat. The UK permanent Representative to the UN (since deceased) told me bluntly that I could not aspire to this post as no woman could ever command the military. "What about Mrs. Thatcher?" I enquired, in vain! The truth was that they wanted their own man and I did not qualify, despite having been a member of the senior branch of the Foreign Service at the beginning of my career.</p> <p>In 1987 Perez de Cuellar at last succeeded in making me Under-Secretary-General when, under his own authority, he reorganised the UN Office at Vienna, (the third Headquarters of the UN), strengthening the authority of the Director General and extending it to cover, inter alia, all UN drug-related activities.</p> <p>I do not think the UK was involved or consulted but Prime Minister Thatcher wrote me a personal letter of congratulations, saying she was happy that the senior woman in the UN was British and occupying a post to which they attributed much importance and offering all her support. She was as good as her word. When she came to the General Assembly the Secretary-General invited me to his meeting with her.</p> <p>She took the lead and, fixing me with a steely blue gaze, said "Since Miss Anstee is here, let's discuss drugs ", launching into a claim that, being a trained chemist, she knew that modern herbicides could provide a quick solution. Taking a deep breath, I mentioned a few other factors such as poverty and the need to reduce demand as well as production and a lively exchange ensued, until she noticed that the Secretary General's eyes were beginning to glaze over and I to fear for my career prospect.</p> <p>The Prime Minister suggested we continue the discussion in her office at 10 Downing Street the next time I was in London. This we duly did, I managed to persuade her to modify her position and the result was the highly successful first and only Global Conference on the reduction of the consumption of narcotic drugs, held under the joint auspices of HMG and the UN Office at Vienna, at which the UK provided funds and venue and my office technical support. It was an excellent example of member state and secretariat cooperation.</p> <p>A crisis at the beginning of my period in Vienna led to a high level intervention by the Foreign Secretary, Geoffrey (later Lord) Howe. The head of one of the drug programmes that was to come under my authority according to the new arrangements took the unethical step of circulating a draft resolution to member states attending a drugs conference rescinding the Secretary-General's decision to appoint me. This flagrant act, contrary to the oath of obedience that we each swore</p>
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	<p>on joining the UN, should have been severely sanctioned immediately but the official in question was a protégé of the Italian Foreign Minister and no Secretary General would risk such a confrontation. It was Geoffrey Howe who took the matter up with Andreotti. An uneasy compromise was achieved but - when new problems arose later on - the UK Foreign Office was not as supportive as Prime Minister Thatcher.</p> <p>True to its tradition, the UK has been much less blatant than other member states in pushing for candidates from its own national government services to occupy senior political posts in the secretariat who are not always fully qualified for that particular function.</p> <p>There have been cases when a UK candidate well suited for one particular post (but unsuccessful) has been switched to another for which they were less well suited, in order to maintain a seat at the political high table in the UN secretariat.</p> <p><u>Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding - UNAVEM II: UN Angola Verification Mission II (1992-3)</u></p> <p>In 1992 Secretary General Boutros Ghali appointed me to my last official field posting as Special Representative of the Secretary General for Angola and Head of UNAVEM II.</p> <p>UNAVEM II was one of the first batch of the peacekeeping missions that emerged after the end of the Cold War, designed to embrace elements other than those of a purely military nature. In the case of UNAVEM II the mission was to end in free and fair multi-party elections and the installation of a new, democratic government. Based on negotiations in which the UN had had no part, the Security Council mandate limited its role to monitoring the execution of the Bicesse Accords and provided an inadequate mandate and resources.</p> <p>The UK presumably took part in the Council's discussions but does not seem to have argued against the "small and manageable operation" favoured by the Council. By that time the UK had abandoned its earlier practice of contributing military contingents to UN peacekeeping forces on the ground. However, the UK Ambassador to Angola was extremely helpful in supporting my difficult mission and in feeding back information and requests to London, especially during the battle for Luanda in which he played a key role, as the UK was President of the European Union at the time.</p> <p>I held regular meetings of all UN Ambassadors in Angola, especially those with seats on the Security Council, so as to keep them informed of developments and needs. The irony was that those of us on the ground usually found ourselves in agreement but that our views were not shared by the policy makers in our respective headquarters who had no direct experience of field activities but seemed rather to act on collective thinking at a different level.</p> <p>It was a combination of all these factors that led to the tragic culmination of the mission in failure, with an incalculable loss of Angolan lives. Behind it all there was general international indifference to the plight of an African country, a forgotten tragedy in contrast to the conflict in former Yugoslavia perceived (wrongly, in a global geopolitical context) as greater. This was a general failure in international strategic</p>
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	<p>thinking, but I wished that the UK, with its vast international experience, had taken the initiative in broaching an alternative approach.</p> <p>Another fundamental flaw in UNAVEM II was the lack of any provision in the mandate or the resources for peacebuilding (a concept still in its infancy then), or the assurance of sustainable peace. The mission was to hold elections and then leave the country to its fate. I had to canvas individual member states for voluntary funding of such obvious immediate follow-up measures as vocational training of demobilised soldiers (Germany did this), or the provision of barracks to house the new army (the UK did this).</p> <p><u>Military Intelligence</u></p> <p>The UN was not supposed to gather military intelligence but only "information" of a less sensitive nature. SRSGs were thus dependent on major powers with sophisticated intelligence services to provide secret data that might be relevant in a conflict situation. The US and UK occasionally did this but not always. Coming back through London from New York to Luanda in June 1992, about halfway through the electoral registration period in Angola, I was invited to attend a meeting in the Foreign Office to discuss the situation.</p> <p>Throughout the meeting there was an undercurrent of expectation as if something of importance was about to be imparted but it was never divulged (even though I had myself been a member of the UK Foreign Service, had also worked in the Prime Minister's Office and had sworn the Official Secrets Act). It was only months later that I learned that an act was being planned by one of the parties to the conflict that would have disrupted the electoral process. By then preventive action had been taken, but it would have affected some of my decisions had I known what was going on at the time.</p> <p><u>Security Council Resolutions on UNAVEM II</u></p> <p>By rejecting the election results of September 1992, withdrawing his Generals from the newly-formed joint army and resuming the war, Savimbi was in flagrant breach of the commitments UNITA and he had undertaken under the Bicesse Peace Accords and with the Security Council. This rank disobedience should have been punished immediately with the strongest sanctions. Instead the Council adopted a series of half-hearted resolutions, wringing its hands over the turn of events and timidly increasing the strength of the verbs but still stopping short of any form of sanctions until September 1993, and even then applying only a limited regime. The reason for this was US insistence that they still had influence with Savimbi, did not want to alienate him and could persuade him to cooperate.</p> <p>The UNITA lobby in Washington continued very strong and the collapse of the Soviet Union meant that their priorities lay elsewhere and so the US was taking the lead. By January 1993 UNITA had occupied huge swathes of the country and a humanitarian crisis of vast dimensions was overwhelming the civilian population. About that time the Security Council called upon the SRSG to mount a large programme of humanitarian relief with the resources at its disposal (these were rapidly diminishing and this anodyne phrase meant that no additional money would be forthcoming). It would have been helpful if the UK had weighed in and insisted that UNITA's transgressions were summarily dealt</p>
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	<p>with and resourced.</p> <p>As the conflict and UNITA threats against my person escalated after the elections in September 1992 the Security Council adopted a number of resolutions and Presidential statements calling on UNITA to withdraw the death threats against me. The UK was part of these supportive measures. When my mission in Angola ended in July 1993 I had a farewell session with the Council, at which the President, then the UK Ambassador, Sir David (later Lord) Hannay, was particularly generous in his tribute to me.</p> <p><u>Structural Reforms in Planning Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding Operations in New York</u></p> <p>The Brahimi report (2000), commissioned to recommend measures to improve the effectiveness of peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations, contained a paragraph recommending that the Secretary General should prepare a UN Plan for Peacebuilding that would ensure the effective participation and cohesion of all the relevant agencies and organisations of the UN system, through all stages of dealing with a particular conflict, from the initial ceasefire to a long term development programme designed to address the causes of conflict and establish conditions for sustainable peace. Now retired, I was asked to undertake this work as a consultant attached to the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and assisted by a small team from the Secretariat.</p> <p>We produced an articulated plan which envisaged a versatile system adaptable to each individual situation. It comprised a multi-agency body at Headquarters, centred on DPA, to establish the overall policy and the respective roles of the various entities at the start of the operation. Once the overall plan had been devised for a country, responsibility for its implementation would be delegated to a similarly composed multi-agency body at the field level, led by the SRSG. The central policy board at Headquarters would receive regular reports from the field and monitor progress, intervening only in the event of emergencies or deviations from the original policy blueprint. In short there was to be maximum centralisation of policy between the various UN bodies concerned to ensure cohesion of overall approach, combined with maximum decentralisation of execution to the field level to ensure rapid and efficient implementation, reduce bureaucracy and increase accountability.</p> <p>The snag was that my remit required the final draft to be cleared with no less than 17 UN agencies. This took an inordinate amount of time and when the comments (mostly self-serving) were included the proposal resembled a "dog's dinner" rather than the original coherent and integrated plan. I had suggested that a pilot project be tried in one or two countries where the conditions were not too adverse. To my dismay the Administrative Committee on Coordination decided on Afghanistan where the Taliban were just tightening their hold! An integrated strategy was prepared there but predictably could never be implemented. The plan was discussed by governments in various fora but in the absence of a powerful backer and amid clamour for a Peacebuilding Commission it lost its way.</p> <p>After some previous dispiriting experiences I had foreseen that something like this would happen and at an early stage sought to interest the UK Permanent Mission. I saw the Ambassador and a member of the UK</p>
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	<p>mission came from time to time for briefing but there was no real support. I had thought that this could be a worthy cause for the UK to support, which, if successful, would also lay the foundations for solving other problems of coherence and efficiency latent in the UN system, but the UK's priorities lay elsewhere.</p> <p>Another great chance of reform was lost. I do not know what the Secretariat did with the ill-fated plan. I have a copy!</p> <p><u>Conclusions</u></p> <p>I have described some examples of two kinds of UK performance:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - in promoting UK representation in the staff of the Secretariat - in supporting specific projects or missions in which UK nationals in the Secretariat are playing a lead role. <p>Of the two I consider the second the more important. In both cases UK performance has been chequered in my experience, sometimes brilliant, sometimes disappointing. It is thus impossible to reach an overall assessment.</p> <p>One general impression I do have is that the UK could have been more adventurous in taking the lead in strengthening Security Council resolutions, establishing mandates and resource levels for peacekeeping and peacebuilding. There has perhaps been excessive readiness in following the position of the USA rather than ploughing a more independent furrow.</p>
Please provide references to books/memoirs/reports/articles, etc., if relevant:	n/a

Martin Barber

Position(s) held (including dates):	Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1996-8
Which session is your brief most relevant to?	Session 3: The UK and Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding
Brief Title:	Short assignments
Year, Country, UN Agency where appropriate:	1996-8, Bosnia and Herzegovina, DPKO, UNMIBH.
What were the main lessons learned?	<p>Six month assignments of British military personnel by NATO to act, for example, as military liaison officers to the Office of the High Representative were too short to allow the officers to do the job effectively.</p> <p>This is just one example of a problem met in many other situations in which the assignments of military officers from many countries were simply too short. This led to the impression that the governments and military establishments of troop contributing countries were less interested in the success of the mission than in providing field experience and medals to their officers.</p>
Please provide references to books/memoirs/reports/articles, etc., if relevant:	Martin Barber, <i>Blinded by Humanity</i> , London, IB Tauris, 2015. Chapter 5

reports/articles, etc., if relevant:	
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James Bridge

Position(s) held (including dates):	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Chief Executive and Secretary-General of the UK National Commission for UNESCO, October 2011 – present; - Alternate Member of the UNESCO Executive Board, 2011-2015.
Which session is your brief most relevant to?	Relevant to more than one session
Brief Title:	Supporting the UK reform and effectiveness agenda at UNESCO
Year, Country, UN Agency where appropriate:	2011-2016 UNESCO and The UK National Commission for UNESCO.
What were the main lessons learned?	<p>Buy-in from other Member States and senior UNESCO leadership is essential.</p> <p>From a UK National Commission for UNESCO (UKNC) organisational perspective, working in co-ordination with the UK reform and effectiveness agenda at UNESCO is necessary to achieve change.</p> <p>The agenda for change, from a UK perspective, was set out in the 2011 UK Multilateral Aid Review and its subsequent updates in 2013 and 2016.</p> <p>Providing solutions through specific policy and programme recommendations (via UK National Commission for UNESCO policy briefs) timed to align with UNESCO decision making processes proved effective. These policy briefs are produced in close consultation with the UK Permanent Delegation to UNESCO and UK government departments and will closely reflect or will be UK policy.</p> <p>The UNESCO funding crisis (when the US and Israel stopped their contributions) helped focus minds on priorities at UNESCO. This contributed to a welcoming environment for Member States and their National Commissions to suggest solutions to contribute to achieve these priorities.</p> <p>The UK's election to Chair of UNESCO's Finance Commission (Committee) was significant.</p> <p>The UKNC developed working relationships with the other member states and National Commissions and shared information in the spirit of learning from each other. This approach opened doors.</p> <p>The UKNC produced over 12 policy briefs per year and a report on methodology for the UK and other member states to use to capture the national value of UNESCO ("The Wider Value of UNESCO to the UK"). Other member states were interested in the UKNC approach and in their own work to measure value, produced analysis which over the long term will support a more effective UNESCO.</p>
Please provide references to books/memoirs/ reports/articles, etc., if relevant:	<p>Policy brief and Wider Value sections of www.unesco.org.uk (the website of the UK National Commission for UNESCO)</p> <p>The Wider Value of UNESCO to the UK 2011-2013 ISBN 978-0-904608-02-1</p>

	<p>The Wider Value of UNESCO to the UK 2014-15 ISBN 978-0-9044608-04-5</p> <p>UK National Commission for UNESCO policy brief series ISSN 2050-8212</p> <p>WWW.UNESCO.ORG.UK</p>
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John Burley

<i>Position(s) held (including dates):</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Economic planner in Uganda's Ministry of Planning and Economic Development, 1967-72; - UNDP in economic/programme management, 1972-9; - UN, Office of the Director-General for Development and International Economic Cooperation, 1980-6; - UNCTAD, Programme Support, then Director, Trade Efficiency, 1987-2014.
<i>Which session is your brief most relevant to?</i>	Relevant to more than one session
<i>Brief Title:</i>	Development and the functions of the State
<i>Year, Country, UN Agency where appropriate:</i>	n/a
<i>What were the main lessons learned?</i>	<p>My career in economic development ranged from purely national concerns in a newly independent African country to the role of economic advisers in UN programmes, from UN system-wide concerns of coherence and coordination to the proper role of external trade in the development process. Such issues are of importance to the maintenance of peace because of the links between security, stability and economic progress. Three examples perhaps stand-out:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The absolute importance of the State: nothing should be done to weaken the institutions of the state (not always the case in the last 30-40 years) and external partners should do what they can to support the key institutions, especially the public administration and the judiciary; - The tensions that arise over conflicts to resources, especially land and water (in a domestic context) and natural resources/minerals (in an international context); - The transnational nature of problems (for example, disease, migration, cyber security, financial speculation) that aggravate national difficulties and that require regional or international solutions when the necessary institutional infrastructure is absent.
<i>Please provide references to books/memoirs/reports/articles, etc., if relevant:</i>	Winner 1965 Cecil Peace Prize for an Essay on "UN Peace-keeping Forces" which (albeit based on relatively limited experiences by then) proposed a composite UN Force with (limited) permanent forces and larger permanent stand-by and ad hoc/on-call forces. Such a force would have been both effective and economical.

Sir Jeremy Greenstock

<i>Position(s) held (including dates):</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Political Director, FCO, 1996-8; - UK Permanent Representative, New York, 1998-2003; - UK Special Envoy for Iraq, 2003-4.
<i>Which session is your brief most relevant to?</i>	Relevant to more than one session

<i>Brief Title:</i>	Making the most of the UK's potential at the UN
<i>Year, Country, UN Agency where appropriate:</i>	n/a
<i>What were the main lessons learned?</i>	<p>The UK, if given sufficient political steer, can consistently raise the quality of UNSC outcomes through teamwork, experience, drafting ability, flexible thinking and relationship-building.</p> <p>The British system encourages delegation to middle and junior levels, accelerating on-the-job training and realising the full potential of individual talent.</p> <p>The UK's history as a global trading and colonial power allows it to accumulate and draw on a whole wealth of understanding of local, cross-cultural and conflict-prone situations.</p> <p>To capitalise on this in a sensitive political environment, UK diplomats often have to work obliquely or discretely, prioritising the collective interest of UN members.</p> <p>Permanent membership of the UNSC is a resented privilege, and has constantly to be 'earned' in the eyes of other member states by visible contributions to solving shared problems.</p> <p>The status of the Security Council in the UN hierarchy of institutions should not blind UK operators to the fact that the UN is primarily about development of less well-resourced nations, and that international peace and security is a sub-category of development.</p> <p>The capacity of elected Security Council members varies, and the degree to which the UK helps them to adjust to SC work raises the Council's potential to achieve sensible outcomes.</p> <p>Any UK Permanent Representative has to ensure that London understands and supports these considerations, at both Ministerial and official levels, so that direct and short-term UK interests do not deny room for the wider collective interest to be served.</p>
<i>Please provide references to books/memoirs/reports/articles, etc., if relevant:</i>	The UN Security Council in the Twenty-First Century, edited by Sebastian von Einsiedel, David Malone and Bruno Stagno Ugarte, Rienner

Sheila Macrae

<i>Position(s) held (including dates):</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - United Nations Population Fund, 1988-2005; <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o 2004-5, Fiji, covering fourteen countries; o 2003-4, Cambodia; o 1998-2003, Thailand (including Laos and Myanmar); o 1998, New York Headquarters; o 1992-8, Kenya; o 1988-92, Vietnam; - UNFPA Representative in all countries, Chairperson UN Theme Group on HIV/AIDS in Thailand and Director, Pacific Country Technical Support Team in Fiji, 2001-3; - Overseas Development Administration (now DfID) and Senior
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	<p>Population Adviser, Department of Health and Population, London, 1982-7;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Visiting Fellow, Department of Demography, Australian National University, Canberra, 1987 & 1981; - Consultant Demographer, United Nations Demographic Centre, Cairo, 1981-82; - UNFPA, Kiribati and Tuvalu, 1979-80; - Consultant Demographer, South Pacific Commission, New Caledonia, 1980-2; - Research and Evaluation Officer, International Planned Parenthood Federation, Botswana, 1972-3.
<i>Which session is your brief most relevant to?</i>	Session 2: Prevention and early action: the UK's performance
<i>Brief Title:</i>	Bilateral Support to the United Nations
<i>Year, Country, UN Agency where appropriate:</i>	1988-92, Vietnam, UNFPA
<i>What were the main lessons learned?</i>	<p>The UK Bilaterals, while already donors to the UN, should more frequently channel programme specific funding through the appropriate UN office in-country rather than providing it directly bilaterally.</p> <p>This would benefit from the UN's comparative advantage of political neutrality and also reduce the number of partners the government has to deal with in one project (the census being a good example of this).</p>
<i>Please provide references to books/memoirs/reports/articles, etc., if relevant:</i>	Witness Seminar I Report

Arturo Martinez

<i>Position(s) held (including dates):</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Chief Service of Seeds and Plant Genetics Resources for Food and Agriculture at FAO, 2001-8; - Interim Secretariat of Convention on Biological Diversity, UNEP, 1993-6.
<i>Which session is your brief most relevant to?</i>	Relevant to more than one session
<i>Brief Title:</i>	Seed release, Moral and ethical issues
<i>Year, Country, UN Agency where appropriate:</i>	2002, Afghanistan, FAO and other relevant agencies.
<i>What were the main lessons learned?</i>	<p>Assistance after a conflict in the medium term, especially in the case of food production, should be careful in its assessments in order to provide seeds and crops adapted to local cultures and ecosystems. This is not easy as in many case the interests of donor countries do not match the actual needs of the local communities.</p> <p>The moral and ethics issues include the fight against corruption. The UN as other relevant international organizations suffers from the same malaise. The Security Council may provide guidance and new rulings on this matter. In particular on matters of food aids, refugee issues including UN Officers and Government Representatives. We still regret the case of</p>

	embezzlement of a former UN President of the General Assembly between September 2013 and September 2014. Strong leadership by the UN General Secretary and the involvement of the Security Council may also update an ethical code of conduct not only for New York but also for all the UN system including those UN organizations in Geneva, Rome and Vienna.
<i>Please provide references to books/memoirs/reports/articles, etc., if relevant:</i>	n/a

Edward Mortimer

<i>Position(s) held (including dates):</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Head of Speechwriting Unit, EOSG, 1998-2006; - Director of Communications, EOSG, 2001-2006.
<i>Which session is your brief most relevant to?</i>	Relevant to more than one session
<i>Brief Title:</i>	The Secretary-General's Public Diplomacy
<i>Year, Country, UN Agency where appropriate:</i>	UN Secretariat - 1999, Yugoslavia; 1994, Sudan.
<i>What were the main lessons learned?</i>	<p>Most UN officials dealing with peace and security are interacting mainly with member states (particularly their governments and armed forces) or with parties to conflict. These are, of course, also essential partners or interlocutors for the Secretary-General. But he (or hopefully in the future she) has also to consider the overall reputation of the UN and the confidence in it that the peoples of the world need to have if it is to do its work effectively over time.</p> <p>As chief speechwriter and later also director of communications for Kofi Annan, I saw myself as having a special responsibility for this aspect of his work - one to which he himself attached great importance. Sometimes this led to tensions, or at least differences of opinion, with colleagues in other parts of the Secretariat.</p> <p>In 1999, during and after the Kosovo crisis, I found myself on the side of those who wanted him to stress what later became known as the Responsibility to Protect, as opposed to those who were more concerned with respect for the sovereignty of member states. This argument re-surfaced in 2004 over Darfur. The DPKO's main concern was to preserve the Comprehensive Agreement between north and south Sudan, while DPA wanted above all to preserve channels of communication with the government in Khartoum.</p> <p>The Secretary-General, while fully recognising the importance of those considerations, was even more concerned not to allow the UN to repeat the mistakes of 1994-5, when it had appeared an impotent witness of genocide in Rwanda and Srebrenica. This was especially true because his first major pronouncement on the subject coincided with the 10th anniversary of the Rwandan genocide. His speech to the Commission on Human Rights on that occasion, reflecting this concern, caused some discomfort to the heads of the two departments.</p>

Please provide references to books/memoirs/reports/articles, etc., if relevant:	Kofi Annan, WE THE PEOPLES: A UN for the 21st Century (Paradigm 2014), especially pp 90 and 193-217.
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Maggie Nicholson

Position(s) held (including dates):	- Most recently, Deputy Director, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, New York.
Which session is your brief most relevant to?	Relevant to more than one session
Brief Title:	Due Integration of Human Rights into Peace Operations; Understanding Human Rights in Peace Operations; Due Inclusion of Human Rights in Discussions on Peace and Security.
Year, Country, UN Agency where appropriate:	n/a
What were the main lessons learned?	<p>Despite the lip service paid to their critical importance for sustainable peace, human rights are still regularly treated as a separate, distinct issue in discussions on international peace and security – something taken care of by the High Commissioner and in Geneva, or even by NGOs. Notwithstanding a number of efforts to address this problem, there still does not appear to be a genuine understanding of human rights and their centrality in practice, when set against the needs for political and military presence. In many discussions they would be brought up as a possible hindrance to peace negotiations, and this not just by governments.</p> <p>With some notable exceptions – one early example is that of El Salvador in 1992 – human rights have regularly been the poor relation in peacekeeping discussions, including at inter-Secretariat level. Aside from ritual mention in preambles, they were often left out of Security Council resolutions setting up peacekeeping operations. In consequence, there was no adequate support for them – human or financial. One egregious example was that of the establishment in 2011 of UNMISS, the Mission in South Sudan. In consequence, once a mission was on the ground and realized the essential need, OHCHR would be asked to scramble to use its regular operating budget to finance and provide human resources in peacekeeping operations until such time as some backtracking could be done and appropriate provision made – which it rarely could without damaging OHCHR's core work of support to the human rights treaty bodies and so on.</p> <p>Some improvement in this situation, albeit modest, followed the introduction in 2010 of the post of Assistant Secretary General for Human Rights in New York. The first (still current) incumbent has been able to be included among the SG's close advisers, to accompany him on mission and in talks, to ensure that the High Commissioner is now a more regular contributor to Security Council discussions. In 2010, certain SC members were arguing forcefully that human rights and the HC had no place in the Security Council. In the month of December 2015, the Council was briefed by the High Commissioner twice and once by the ASG. OHCHR's contributions to the SG's talking points and to Policy Committee discussions have become more pertinent and influential.</p>

	<p>While the ASG's staff in New York remain junior (P5 the highest level), it is difficult for human rights to find the same voice at headquarters as enjoyed by peacekeeping or development or other sectors. The office might still be left out of discussions, reliant on strategic alliances built with colleagues in other parts of the secretariat and agencies that will alert OHCHR to impending discussions.</p> <p>Before I left NY in the spring of 2012, OHCHR brought the heads of human rights operations in a number of peacekeeping operations to New York to meet with key department chiefs, with members of the Security Council and others, to promote a better understanding of their work as well as for them to get a better understanding of work at UN HQ. Interlocutors appeared positively surprised by the contribution of these staff members. This would be an exercise worth repeating on a regular basis.</p> <p>Human Rights Up Front, launched in 2013, is a recent initiative aimed to address related issues. Yet it itself seems to be raising hackles on those who consider themselves more practically minded. Could it be just a question of learning to speak the same language? Like the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy, its success relies on being taken up by all relevant sectors and not left to be shouldered by OHCHR.</p> <p>OHCHR is still sometimes its own worst enemy. Its mission preparedness is much better than it was in the past – when senior UN staff would often look for human rights support to non-governmental human rights organizations rather than their colleagues in Geneva. But it is still not adequate. Staff are often more junior than their counterparts in other departments and lacking in the HQ experience to be able to contribute effectively to discussions.</p> <p>Until such time as OHCHR is properly integrated into the United Nations HQ Secretariat (the mention in the programme about the need for links between Geneva and New York serve to underscore the impossibilities of this disjunction), and accorded an operating budget and staff complement in line with other parts of the system, human rights will remain a weak point in the UN's peace operations.</p> <p>Recommendations</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • don't use human rights as a stick to beat others with but strategize deftly with allies as to the most effective means to address the issue of human rights; • make adequate provision from the start for human rights protection and promotion in any UN missions (see also report of High Level Panel on this); • encourage human rights input at the highest level; • strengthen the human rights capacity of the United Nations as a whole; • consider bringing the OHCHR to New York.
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Please provide references to books/memoirs/reports/articles, etc., if relevant:	Report of the High Level Panel, A/70/95; S/2015/446 para 265; Recs 267 (a) and (b).
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Parmeet Singh

Position(s) held (including dates):	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Programme Co-ordinator, DTCD, UN New York, 1987-94; - Senior Adviser on Statistical Development, ECA, Addis Ababa, 1994-6; - Medium & Short Term Assignments UNDP in Zambia, Nigeria, Liberia, Kenya, Somalia, Uganda, 1997-2002;
Which session is your brief most relevant to?	Relevant to more than one session
Brief Title:	Work experience in UN on Development & not Peace Keeping; but bear in mind the role of the UN in Peacekeeping.
Year, Country, UN Agency where appropriate:	n/a
What were the main lessons learned?	Working in the UN on Development exposed me to the impact of peace keeping & the role of Security Council.
Please provide references to books/memoirs/reports/articles, etc., if relevant:	n/a

David Stephen

Position(s) held (including dates):	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Speechwriter, Executive Office of the Secretary-General, UN/NY, 1992-6 and 1997; - Director, United Nations Human Rights Verification Mission, MINUGUA Guatemala, 1996-7; - Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of United Nations Political Office for Somalia, UNPOS, 1997-2002; - Representative of the Secretary-General and Director, UN Peace-building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau, UNOGBIS, 2002-4;
Which session is your brief most relevant to?	Session 3: The UK and Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding
Brief Title:	Thoughts on my Experiences
Year, Country, UN Agency where appropriate:	As above
What were the main lessons learned?	<p><u>The role of the United Nations in fragile states</u></p> <p>Working for the United Nations in fragile states in crisis is often seen as difficult or impossible, if not wholly futile. But the SG's Representative can become an important moderating influence, exercising good offices in a constructive way, provided neutrality is maintained. This is because a crucial feature of state collapse is the breakdown of trust among elites.</p> <p>The influence of the Representative of the Secretary-General - therefore the potential for discreet peace-making - is probably greater in small or</p>

	<p>weak states than in larger operations. The SG's Representative is in a highly privileged position, with good access to local elites. For that reason, I believe there is often more scope for constructive initiatives by the Secretary-General's Representative in small states than in the large missions.</p> <p>The international doctrine, however - often alluded to by Boutros-Ghali - is that sub-regional countries and organisations should have the primary responsibility for solving disputes in their sub-region. Boutros' doctoral thesis in Paris in the late 1940s had been on the interpretation of the UN Charter in this regard. He saw a legal responsibility for peace-making, based on a hierarchy rising from sub-regional organisations, through regional bodies, to the Security Council. In the case of Guinea-Bissau this meant a chain passing from ECOWAS, through the African Union, to the UN. In the case of Somalia, IGAD, AU, UN; and so on.</p> <p>The problem here is that the sub-regional organisations are sometimes seen as the instruments of powerful neighbours - Ethiopia, and latterly Kenya, in the case of Somalia, and Senegal in the case of Guinea-Bissau. Are their interests compatible with those of weak, divided neighbours requiring renewal and development? These questions need to be faced. Many Somalis claim that Ethiopia has decided that a Somalia in chaos poses less of a potential threat to Ethiopia than would an authentic process of Somali self-determination.</p> <p><u>Ethnic issues and State boundaries</u></p> <p>The ethnic issue was paramount in both the countries where I worked. Old ethnic scores were being settled in Guinea-Bissau, despite the progressive language used in official pronouncements. And clan loyalties, fears and resentments run deep in Somalia. One of the reasons for the collapse of the Somali state, indeed, was the perception that the last President, Siad Barre, had used his power as national leader to reward members of his own clan, the Marehan, rather than all Somalis.</p> <p>When it comes to re-building states, which must involve re-creating loyalties to institutions rather than to clans or tribes, a major obstacle remains the boundaries inherited from colonialism. It is still taboo to discuss such issues, but at some stage the question will need to be opened up. Loyalty to states inherited from colonialism - evidenced for example by football matches - is not inconsiderable, but a recasting of boundaries could re-cement old loyalties into new patterns.</p> <p>Somalis are fond of pointing out that their nation, their people - who are homogeneous, speaking one language and sharing one religion - live under five different sovereignties - former Italian Somalia, former British Somaliland, Djibouti, the Somalis of Ethiopian region 5 (the Ogaden) and the Somalis of Kenya. Indeed, the Ogaden war was fought in part to regain the Somali lands ruled by Ethiopia and the Somali flag continues to carry five flags, one for each Somali territory.</p> <p>In West Africa, the carve-up among the British, French, Portuguese, and Germans in the nineteenth century divided ethnic entities on a north-south axis when their settlements went from East to West. Thus the lands grazed by the Peul or Hausa/Fulani people (Fula in Guinea-Bissau) stretch from the Gambia south to Nigeria.</p>
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	<p><u>The International Civil Service</u></p> <p>I was hugely impressed by the rich variety of people who work for the United Nations, a multi-faceted human organism staffed by people of many nationalities, backgrounds and approaches.</p> <p>The United Nations Charter requires that the Secretary-General, in making appointments to the Secretariat, should have regard to the principle of equitable geographical distribution. While recruitment to the international civil service used to be by open competition, and for life, as, for example, in the British or French systems, in recent years - and certainly by the time I joined the Secretariat in 1992 - most appointments have been made, usually following advertisement and interview, on a fixed-term contract basis. Almost none of my colleagues in the Secretariat were lifers. Not all senior officials were graduates of elite universities, however. As in the British civil service, it was possible for those recruited from school as junior clerks to rise high in the system, and several senior officials, by the early 1990s, had followed that path.</p> <p>There was, when I joined the United Nations, a clear gulf between those who worked in New York, and those in the field. Each group regarded the other with suspicion, and there was little interchange between them. Few senior officials in New York had served in the field. Efforts have been made recently to ensure that all career staff serve both in New York and overseas in the course of their careers. Many younger people joining the United Nations begin their careers on short-term contracts in missions before securing posts in New York.</p> <p>The image of the international civil service, certainly in the period leading up to the fall of the Berlin Wall and end of the Cold War, was of a passive, uninspiring bureaucracy which coped with the strains of international geopolitics by adopting the path of least resistance. Language tended to be deliberately as non-committal, undramatic, uncontroversial, and therefore as uninspiring, as possible.</p> <p>Discipline - such as would be normal in a national civil service - presented problems. Some officials were rumoured to be working for their national governments, even though every international official pledges to work for the United Nations alone. Rumours were rife that some officials were protected by their Member States from scrutiny or oversight: the exact role or contribution to the machine of some officials was either not known or a matter for speculation.</p> <p>The Australian writer Shirley Hazzard produced her hilarious "portraits from Organisation life" in the 1960s. They portray an Organisation attempting both to reflect a world emerging from an era of European colonisation, with an enormous influx of new members from the emerging Third World, and grappling with the political manifestations of the cold war. According to her, the Organisation had bred, out of a staff recruited from its hundred member nations, a peculiarly anonymous variety of public official, of recognisable aspect and manner: "It is," she wrote, "a type to be seen to this very day, anxiously carrying a full briefcase or fumbling for a <i>laissez-passer</i> in airports throughout the world.....(The Organisation's) hope for survival lay, like that of all organisations, in the subordination of individual gifts to general procedures ... it seemed that (Algie) was constantly being asked to take leave of those senses of humour, proportion, and the ridiculous that he had carefully nurtured</p>
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	<p>and refined all his life." Shirley Hazzard, <u>People in Glass Houses</u>, New York, 1967</p> <p>This unflattering image of the international civil service helped to form my expectations of what life in the Secretariat in New York would be like. I found that the reality was different. By 1992 the Secretariat was no longer, in any sense, a battleground between East and West, although language and practice still reflected, in odd ways, old cold war divisions: for example, visitors to the United Nations who went on an official tour received a lecture on nuclear disarmament, and the United Nations' role in it, which prominently featured the (by then extinct) Soviet Union. The USSR was portrayed as essentially benign, and certainly not as an imperial power, even though new member states, formerly part of the Soviet Union, saw themselves as former colonies.</p> <p>When Boutros Ghali arrived, the bureaucracy was slowly and painfully adapting to the post-cold war era. But the plans of the Secretary-General and the political agenda in the United States were at variance. In US politics the UN bureaucracy was seen as a mess to be tackled rather than as a sleepy outfit requiring reform. Boutros appointed a succession of Americans to the senior post of Under-Secretary General for Administration, but no dramatic changes took place. Yet among the UN staff were many people of great commitment and talent, who deserve better.</p> <p>The questions for discussion here are: how can the international civil service be revived and strengthened? How can existing talent be nurtured and able new-comers be appointed?</p> <p><u>Being British at the UN</u></p> <p>Someone wrote, some years ago, that being British in the world is like embarking on life's long journey with a first-class ticket. The language, the historic role of Britain in the United Nations, and the ubiquity of British influence in sport, in the media and entertainment industries throughout the world ensure that Britain is, in the jargon, a highly visible brand.</p> <p>In the United Nations the British are seen as key players, and British officials, both the UK civil servants in the Mission (UKMIS) and British people working as international civil servants in the Secretariat, are widely admired, among their foreign colleagues, for their professionalism, and notably for their drafting skills both at the level of the Security Council and in committee. For example, the legal experts in the UK Mission are often key participants in the drafting of important resolutions and statements. There is a strong view that British secretaries are best. English humour is highly appreciated.</p> <p>English is the lingua franca of the United Nations (although I served in two missions where it was not the working language). This gives British officials a considerable and obvious advantage over those for whom English is not the first language. I was told when I went to work for Boutros-Ghali that the United Nations used British forms and style, for example, writing of the United Nations Organisation, and not the (US form) Organization, and the UN Development Programme, not Program.</p> <p>It was Douglas (now Lord) Hurd who advanced the proposition that English rather than German became the language of the United States</p>
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	<p>because of the special qualities of the English language, and who famously opined that Britain "punches above its weight" in international affairs. In neither assertion, in my view, was he correct. Britain does, as I can attest, in a very figurative sense, "punch above its weight" at the United Nations. But the metaphor is not apt: no punching is involved. This is a triumph of soft power, but power nonetheless. Britain's effectiveness is in part the result of the resources it devotes (or did in the 1990s) to the United Nations; there was an expansion of staff in UKMIS in the early 1990s; and in part the result of Britain's historic "great power" status at the United Nations.</p> <p>English has triumphed, and the British have played a key role in the United Nations, for political reasons. Language use, or repression, is an expression of power: the most powerful nation today, the United States, speaks English. The use of German was outlawed in the United States in the nineteenth century much as Catalan was repressed in Franco's Spain in the twentieth, because political hegemony was being imposed, and a single language was deemed to be necessary. Britain's pre-eminence in the United Nations derives from Britain's role as a victorious power in World War II, and as an ally of the United States in the cold war against the Soviet Union. Latterly, Britain had a high profile as a colonial power whose record in the field of de-colonialisation was constantly under the microscope in the United Nations and whose relative wealth made Britain a key donor and committed participant in the North-South dialogue.</p> <p>But there is a less attractive side to the anglophonism, when it becomes synonymous with monoglottism. The anglophone monoglot, using only English in a community of many linguistic and cultural backgrounds, may assume that he/she is being understood when that is not be the case, and may lack empathy with other, different cultures and traditions.</p> <p>Globalism and the widespread use of English have created the impression that "everyone" in the world speaks, and understands, English. This has resulted in a lowering of interest in, and commitment to, the learning of modern languages in Britain. Politically, the days of the likes of Anthony Eden (who read oriental languages in Oxford) and of Harold Macmillan (who held talks with Charles de Gaulle without interpreters - which may have been unwise politically - are long gone. And ambitious political leaders who prepare for office by visiting world trouble spots (as did Winston Churchill in his youth) are few and far between. Britain should, therefore - while maintaining its deserved reputation for efficacy and skill in diplomacy - work to ensure that its officials, both nationally and in the United Nations Secretariat - do not become cocooned in a monoglot Anglophone world.</p> <p>Today, Britain remains a major power, but it no longer has global reach. And priorities change. Britain was crucial in debates over the Middle East and Southern Africa in the United Nations in the 1970s. By 1992, staff numbers in UKMIS were increased and, under the Permanent Representative Sir David Hannay, British officials played an active part in the renaissance of the Organisation. As a key member of both the UN Security Council and the European Union, Britain was a key player in peace-making and peace-keeping in the former Yugoslavia. But I recall working for Dr David Owen in the late 1970s, that the Ogaden War between Somalia and Ethiopia was not regarded as a British interest;</p>
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
	<p>(although the UK took a very dim view when Cuban troops intervened - on Ethiopia's side). Britain relied on its Italian allies for briefing and information. It did not surprise me; therefore, that Britain did not contribute troops to UNOSOM, the peace-keeping mission in Somalia, in the early 1990s, even though many of its allies did. (Today, paradoxically, Somalia is seen as a major British security interest, in part because of the presence of Islamists in Somalia with links to the Somali community in the UK.)</p> <p>In Guinea-Bissau the British interest is marginal. And although France and Portugal follow events in Guinea-Bissau with interest (and some subterranean rivalry) - both with resident ambassadors - Britain has no resident ambassador and saw little reason to take a close interest. (Britain followed Guinea-Bissau from Senegal, and the neighbourhood includes The Gambia, a former British colony.) Britain was committed to Sierra Leone, just as the French were concerned with Cote d'Ivoire: the problem was that the tutelage of Portugal did not bring economic or military resources to Guinea-Bissau comparable to those Britain and France were able to deploy in their respective former colonies.</p> <p>My point is that Britain's soft power has its limits, and we cannot assume that it will continue indefinitely into the future. We need to consider carefully how it is nurtured and how it is deployed.</p> <p>British UN officials are a unique resource because, as officials pledged to serve no national interest, they develop a unique perspective on international events. Does Britain make use of its soft power, notably by working closely with UK-born UN civil servants? Although states such as Germany hold regular meetings with their staff working in the Secretariat, this was not the practice for Britain until Sir David Hannay held a meeting in 1993 or 1994 which I, at least, found extremely interesting. Is this useful? Is it appropriate?</p>
Please provide references to books/memoirs/reports/articles, etc., if relevant:	n/a

Tekeste Ghebray Tekie

Position(s) held (including dates):	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - UN FAO Representative in Afghanistan, 2007-11; - Officer in Charge, FAO Programme in Iraq and Cluster Coordinator for Agriculture, Food Security, the Environment and Natural Resources Management Cluster, 2005-7; - Cluster Coordinator for Agriculture, Food Security, the Environment and Natural Resources Management Cluster, FAO Programme in Iraq relocated in Amman, 2004-5; - Head of FAO Sulaimaniyah Governorate, Northern Iraq, 2002-4.
Which session is your brief most relevant to?	Relevant to more than one session
Brief Title:	Sessions 2 and 3
Year, Country, UN Agency where appropriate:	2002-7, Iraq, FAO; 2007-12, Afghanistan, FAO.
What were the	Development complements and strengthens peace building.

main lessons learned?	Addressing Emergencies and Rehabilitation creates a favourable atmosphere for peace building. Outside forces cannot bring peace to a nation.
Please provide references to books/memoirs/reports/articles, etc., if relevant:	n/a

Lt Col MW Whitchurch MBE Royal Engineers

Position(s) held (including dates):	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Senior Staff Officer, Operations and Plans, UN Sudan, 2007-8; - Project Officer, Change Management DPKO, UN HQ, 2004-5; - Chief G2 Military Information UN DR Congo, 2003-4.
Which session is your brief most relevant to?	Relevant to more than one session
Brief Title 1:	The practice on the military dimension on UN operations in a mission area
Year, Country, UN Agency where appropriate:	n/a
What were the main lessons learned?	<p><u>Know what the UN can and cannot do</u> Much can be done to avoid war and settle disputes by other means. But when parties resolve to fight the best the UN can do is monitor, looking for ways to manage the conflict so a truce is found. At any stage it must seek to protect civilians from the scourge of conflict. This is not difficult to do.</p> <p><u>Understand the causes of conflict</u> From this the remedies can be identified and this is the basis of any work on resolution. There are several constituents or sides to any country as the diagram shows. The UN family can help by looking to help improve each part where wanted or desired. Patience, determination and feet on the ground are key to making any part of an operation work.</p>  <p><u>Cooperation pays well</u> At 70 years the UN has much for others to learn and working with others such as NATO, AU, EU and OSCE helps all to do better. In doing so never give up and never make friction at any level and in any circle.</p> <p><u>Help with English</u></p>

	<p>The British must offer to help others with improving their English. Most of the time this is the working language. To speak clearly and write simply is to help others who often struggle. Use the style of the Sun Newspaper editorial. Your help is often welcome. Power point is liked by learners.</p> <p><u>Be a good English Butler</u> With the host country remember the UN is at best when it is like an English Butler. Know when to step in and help. Equally know when to keep out of sight but in touch with events. Keep in mind it is their country and let them do things their way. Your answer may often be found to be not as good.</p> <p><u>Learn the culture</u> Know the basics of the languages used. To greet a local in his or her tongue is easy to learn and breaks the ice. Know and respect females and minors.</p> <p><u>Be rational and not national</u> The nub of UN work is about the peoples in the mission area and your national interests come second. This is where the UN often fails.</p> <p><i>Specific points for use by the British as they look to helping the UN:</i></p> <p><u>Make use of the high reputation of the British Armed Forces</u> Many other forces are modelled on the British and several former colonies of the empire are the same. Making use of this characteristic is wise. The Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi Armies are very proud of their methods and know its origins. Therefore apply all the good conventions as taught at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. At the same time seek to learn from others. Be well dressed on and off duty. The others see the British as pukka officers who are a model for others. Exploit this.</p> <p><u>People</u> The UK has tried to get maximum influence with the minimum of number of officers. This means securing the senior staff posts such as Chief of Staff (COS) or a particular branch such as Military Information. Given the quality of British officers this has been very effective and welcome. <u>Improve this by longer tours. The six month practice is of little help and the longer the tour the greater the result. Twelve month stints are the minimum</u> and in COS or Lt Col posts up to two years will help the UN hugely. My evidence is what happened to me and my commander in UN Sudan. UK must select the right people who are wanting to go to the UN for the right reasons. Just filling the slot is no good for anyone. Long term this helps all by doing several tours. Getting a UN job after Army service is an improved possibility.</p> <p><u>Operations</u> Get all (at every level) to dine at the same table so there is common understanding of the work. In Sudan from Sector to Mission level there were frequent meetings with the north and the south sat together with the UN working to bring about the Sudanese Comprehensive Peace Agreement. As incidents flared up and led to conflict all were managed by this timely reaction of these three party teams. It worked well in stopping the return of major conflict.</p>
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	<p><u>Remember the realities of war</u> There is no such thing as a casualty free operation. Ditto the UN. Equally do not underestimate boredom, muddle and waste. Manage fear as taught in the army. Organise rest, food, washing and shelter. If guns must be used then do it as taught by the army. Most in the UN and the warring factions can hit very little beyond 30 mtrs. Dash, diligence and decorum are the best weapons most of the time.</p> <p><u>Know the failings of others and bypass them</u> One nation was so keen to keep the COS post rank of Colonel and yet had no one of the right quality. So they filled it with a major – two ranks below. He added nothing to the mission and often I was doing a lot of what should have been his task. For me this was fine as I was clear it was the UN and the UN SCR that mattered. If this country let the UN down then shame on them. Many nations have inflated their ranks. One nation had all at least one rank higher than their actual ability. Finally when the bullets are flying it becomes clear very quickly who can and cannot cope. All armies have this characteristic. Seek to work through all these failings and strive to make the mission work.</p> <p><u>Handling of Information</u> The UN claims it is at a disadvantage without intelligence. Not so. The world of intelligence is often ineffective and some of its work is not compatible with UN ethos. Instead 90 per cent of the UN information requirement can be met by simple proven techniques using open sources. This includes: ask the right questions, know who can best answer those questions, use cultural radars, pay for information and get out on the ground. We did this in Congo with great success. Glad to expand on this area on request</p> <p><u>The UN has good material</u> UK has kept funding to UN. This is good because the UN has the right scale of equipment and money.</p> <p><u>Be well read</u> Read and know the <i>Economist</i>, <i>International Crisis Group</i> and <i>Defence Intelligence</i> Guides to the country. Learn of other UN missions and the lessons. <i>Peace monger</i> by Marrack Goulding and <i>From Cold War to Hot Peace</i> by Anthony Parsons are first class. Start at the final chapter and read on from there. Buy and use the <i>Bradt</i> guide of the country. In the middle east Al Jazeera English is very accurate. Travel and learn the country.</p> <p><u>Build an ABC for others who come after you</u> Enclosed is a draft of a guide that helps with the practical detail of living in a UN mission. The draft gives a good idea of what must be known.</p> <p><u>Frustration</u> Hot sweet tea and humour are key to the Army. Know what you can change/help, recognise what you cannot and have the wisdom to know the difference. By the third tour this becomes very clear.</p>
Brief title 2:	Waging Peace: UN Operations in the Sudan and Lessons to Learn for Peacekeeping
What were the main lessons learned?	This article covers UN operations in the Sudan from 2005 to 2011. It offers lessons for any Peace Support Operation. The article is a personal view from my service in UN Mission in Sudan as well as previous UN service in

	<p>New York and Democratic Republic of the Congo.</p> <p>Central Africa is fascinating. In terms of inter and intra state conflict, the country is a Staff College dream. War in all its forms is there, including Peace Support Operations run by the UN and African Union. Sudan is a country you have to visit. It is impressive and the people very agreeable. My time dates from 2007 to 08. Since then I have returned on several short trips.</p> <p><u>Background</u></p> <p>Until 9 July 2011, Sudan was the biggest country in Africa. On 9 July 2011 the African South split from the Arab North and formed the Republic of South Sudan. The Arab North or North Sudan includes Darfur or western Sudan. Please note the capital of North Sudan is Khartoum; Juba the capital of the south. Darfur, a province of the north, has El Fashir as its capital.</p> <p><u>Why the wars?</u></p> <p>From 1955 there has been a North South civil war costing some three million dead. There was a pause of 11 years from 1972 to 1983. It then ran on until 2005. In addition, there were several other wars spilling over into Chad, Congo, Libya, Uganda and Eritrea. The causes are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <u>The familiar argument of who is in charge and gives the orders.</u> Readers will recognize this quickly. Are orders given in the EU in London or in Stormont or the equivalent in UK? For Sudan who is in charge was never clear since independence from the British Empire. Khartoum is seen as the capital that does little for the states of Sudan – this is the main cause of anger in Darfur. - <u>The ethnic nature of the country.</u> The Arab north is quite different to the African south. Equally the north has looked down on the south, regarded in the past as a source for slaves and of ivory. This perception of fear of the north by the south remains strong. - <u>Who owns what.</u> When the British left Sudan there was and remains dispute of the border between north and south. This is known as the 1-1-1956 line after the date of independence from UK. This matter was complicated by the discovery of oil in the area and the inter/intra tribal conflicts that have run for centuries in this region. - <u>Other wars in other countries.</u> A common feature of insurgency is to have safe bases in other countries. The Lord's Resistance Army is an extremist Christian movement that seeks to change the government in Uganda. Much of its force sits in South Sudan. The same is true for insurgent groups in Darfur and Chad. - <u>Wars within wars.</u> Such is the size of the Sudan that there are wars within wars. The rule of law is largely absent and matters are settled by fighting. Typical causes can be land, cattle, clashes between farmers and nomads, and banditry or subsistence violence – if you do not fight you will not live. <p><u>How UN Peacekeeping can help - some essential UN theory.</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Formed in 1945 after the catastrophe of two world wars, the role of the UN was to save people from the scourge of war. The success rate has been mixed as we know. Yet it has saved much suffering and loss, doing much to prevent and manage conflict. Like the Irish writer Oscar Wilde who said:
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	<p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o <i>We may all live in the gutter but some of us (like the UN – author's comment) are looking to the stars.</i> - <i>The UN will not get people to heaven but it can save a lot going to hell - to paraphrase one of the founders, Dag Hammarskjold.</i> </p> <p><u>Stopping an interstate or intra state war is very hard.</u></p> <p>However, there is much that can prevent and manage such struggles. Equally, if and when such fights reach an impasse, the UN can help move the situation to peaceful resolution if the conditions are right. The UN has several programs and projects that do much to help build or rebuild countries.</p> <p><u>Now the practice – the UN in Sudan: a tale of two peacekeeping missions.</u></p> <p>http://unmis.unmissions.org/</p> <p>Please see Figure 5. As Africa's longest civil dragged on to about 2002 both sides were exhausted and therefore no decision was possible. Both sides could not achieve a decision. The South wanted to break away and North did not. Here was a chance to resolve this war through peaceful means. The UN and others played a part. This Comprehensive Peace Agreement began in 2005 with the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) in support. Part of this arrangement saw a referendum for the South to stay with the North or become an independent state. Both sides wanted resolution and a third party was able to assist – the UN. The peace lasted and the referendum was carried out without the return of war. This is a credit to North, South and the UN.</p> <p>The matter of Darfur is different. Here is an insurgency by two major rebel groups and several other minor ones. Their main grievance is "what has the Khartoum Government done for us?" The counter insurgency campaign has been (as all such campaigns are) not without errors. Darfur is still in conflict and the conditions for peace are not good. Khartoum thinks they can win and so do the rebels – there is no peace to keep. The African Union leads, with UN in support, peace keeping in Darfur and was quite separate to the UNMIS. This is United Nations and African Union in Darfur (UNAMID). Sadly, it is simply not as experienced or skilled as the UN and can do little to protect the people. This conflict will simmer on. So what can be done? The least bad solution is to protect the people whilst the struggle lingers on.</p> <p><u>So what can be learnt?</u></p> <p><u>Used with skill, the UN has done much to save millions from war.</u></p> <p>But this also relies on the warring factions to play their part. They often do not. Would the British have wanted UN involvement in the Falklands 1982 or Gulf 2003 or Northern Ireland 1969-2006? Certainly not.</p> <p><u>There are times when the UN cannot and should not help if other parties can do better.</u> For example, NATO in Bosnia and the EU, today, have done much more than the UN did.</p> <p><u>The UN and its work are very cheap compared to conventional war and this may be better.</u></p> <p>For example: Cyprus remains unsolved with the Turks in the north and the Greeks in the south. But in between is the UN and the place is stable after a fashion. One of the wars within the wars – Abyei (a sort of Alsace</p>
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	<p>Lorraine of central Africa) in Sudan will have UN in the middle because both sides simply will not agree on what to do.</p> <p><u>Peace Keeping or conflict management can be understood by the old English saying of "it's a storm in a tea cup".</u></p> <p>Nearly every week in my Operations Job over 13 months in the UNMIS, there was violence on a scale with some 50 – 100 deaths. The first task was to understand why the violence had taken place and how best to tackle it. By using local government or UN or simply letting it burn out, whilst trying to protect civilians where possible. This kept the storm in the teacup. But it could spill on to the saucer. This was bearable provided it did not spill onto the table cloth or the main peace agreement with the risk of return to full scale war.</p> <p><u>The case for the use of UN Armed Forces.</u></p> <p>In UNMIS both former sides (north and south) met every month with the UN. These standing meetings were spread across the former war zone. These UN-run standing meetings allowed each side to know the others and build trust. Much conflict was avoided or closed down as a result. All UN bases were properly protected from which work by all parts of the UN was projected. Patrolling was vital to monitor and verify what each side was doing. When an incident occurs the first step is get the facts. If it is a dispute over cattle or land, then it was the host nation to resolve. If it was not, then the UN with North and South would attempt to resolve it. There is no doubt that professional armies are the best at this work. When things go wrong and fighting breaks out, the professional soldiers cope better than others. My service in Ireland, the Balkans and the Gulf was very helpful in understanding the sort of wars we faced. In short UN military operations are trying to meet what Sun Tzu said: the supreme acme of skill is trying to succeed without force.</p> <p><u>The Current Situation (2013).</u></p> <p>Remember the major idea of the UN – to save people from the scourge of war; not only prevention of war but building the conditions for stability. Today there are three UN missions in the Sudan. Please use the link to the UN web sites for more information.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <u>UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS).</u> http://ss.one.un.org/ and http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmiss/. The new South Sudan is a country waiting to fail. No one wants another Somalia and so the UN is working to make the new state more stable. From the Economy to Government and Security Sector Reform, UN, EU, AU and others are helping this new country. The web sites can give you more information. - <u>United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei. (UNISFA).</u> http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unisfa/. The story of Abyei is similar to the conflict between Germany and France over the Alsace – Lorraine – the argument lasted for nearly 80 years. Both North and South Sudan cannot agree who owns the land and oil in Abyei. To this end the dispute is in suspense with a third party (the UN) to keep the peace. This is rather like Cyprus with the Turks in the north and the Greeks in the south with the UN in between. At least this helps reduce the chance of return to war. - <u>UN and African Mission in Darfur. (UNAMID).</u> http://unamid.unmissions.org. The troubles in Darfur will simmer on. Until an impasse by exhaustion is reached, there will be no resolution. The best that can be done is to
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	try to manage the conflict by providing safe areas for refugees and trying to get all parties to use peaceful means in their resolution. So here are some lessons showing how the UN can (and cannot) help with conflicts like those in the Sudans. I hope this is of use to the readers – if only I had known this at the start of my three tours in the UN...
Please provide references to books/memoirs/reports/articles, etc., if relevant:	n/a

Michael Williams

Position(s) held (including dates):	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Deputy Director, Human Rights, UNTAC. Cambodia, 1992-3; - Director of Information, UNPROFOR, former Yugoslavia, 1994-5; - Director, Office of the Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, New York, 1999-2001; - Director Asia and the Middle East, Department of Political Affairs, New York 2005-7; - Under Secretary General and UN Special Representative on the Middle East, Beirut, 2008-11.
Which session is your brief most relevant to?	Relevant to more than one session
Brief Title:	Reflections on the UK and the UN
Year, Country, UN Agency where appropriate:	See above
What were the main lessons learned?	<p>Need for early action and more agile peacekeeping.</p> <p>Bolstering UK's commitment to the UN.</p> <p>Greater commitment on Human Rights.</p>
Please provide references to books/memoirs/reports/articles, etc., if relevant:	<p>Civil - Military Relations and Peacekeeping, International Institute for Strategic Studies/OUP, London, 1998.</p> <p>"The United Nations: Past and Present", International Affairs, Vol 89, No 5, September 2013.</p>